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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, courts have used, or attempted to use, the doctrine of
substituted judgment to compel certain medical procedures upon
incompetents or minors of tender years. The substituted judgment standard,
as first articulated in the case of Ex Parte Whitbread in re Hinde, a Lunatic, holds
that "the court will act with reference to the lunatic, and for his benefit, as it is
probable the lunatic himself would have acted if of sound mind."1 This case
involved a petition for funds to be drawn from the surplus estate of a lunatic
to support his near relatives.
Over the years, courts have extended this doctrine to encompass medical
procedures where a person, incapable of consent, can donate organs or tissues
to a family member in need, or refuse medical treatment under the rubric of a
"substituted judgment.' 2 Courts have also applied this standard to cases where
a parent or guardian wishes to sterilize a retarded minor or adult.3
135 Eng. Rep. 878, (Ch. 1816).
2 Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
3 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Petition to sterilize a somewhat retarded
fifteen year old approved without a hearing, without notice and without a guardian ad
litem using mother's substituted judgment. Id. See also Wentzel v. Montgomery General
Hospital, Inc., 447 A.2d 1244 (Md. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983). Court applies
substituted judgment doctrine to authorize sterilization of an incompetent thirteen year
old. Id.
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In 1990, an Illinois man attempted to have this doctrine applied to a situation
involving young children and a relatively new medical procedure. In the case
of Curran v. Bosze,4 a father wished to compel his illegitimate three and one half
year old twins to submit to blood testing to determine bone-marrow
compatibility with their half-brother. If compatible, the father wished to
compel the twins to submit to a bone marrow harvesting procedure so the cells
could be transplanted into his son who was dying of leukemia. The father
argued that under the doctrine of substituted judgment, the children would
agree to submit to the procedure if they were old enough to make an informed,
rational decision. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this premise, holding that
the future intentions of three and one half year olds could not be ascertained
by a court of law or anybody else, and therefore a substituted judgment
standard was inappropriate. While the court did not permit this procedure in
this instance, the case raises interesting questions about the application of the
substituted judgment doctrine as it relates to increasing advances in medical
technology.
In many cases, courts have incorrectly applied the doctrine of "substituted
judgment" to violate the bodily integrity of a minor (who is usually physically
or mentally disabled), or an adult incompetent, to bring about a result which
on its face seems beneficial to all involved. What courts have failed to do,
however, is protect the best interests of these incompetent persons and to
recognize their right to be protected, especially when they cannot consent, from
non-therapeutic bodily invasions. In this context, "best interests" are
determined by weighing the risks, needs and benefits to the affected person.5
The type of "non-therapeutic" procedures to which courts typically apply
substituted judgment are those which are of no physical benefit to the
incompetent person, but which may benefit another person or the guardians
of the incompetent individual.
The doctrine of substituted judgment was originally applied in terms of
property issues, while the best interests standard was typically applied to
situations involving health interests of minors and incompetents. Over time,
however, courts have come to confuse the best interests standard with the
substituted judgment doctrine in certain situations and apply the substituted
judgment doctrine to cases in which it is not appropriate. This
misinterpretation and confusion often endangers the life and health of minors
and incompetents, and places them in positions where courts and families may
take advantage of their legal disability. This article will discuss the doctrine of
substituted judgment in reference to these issues and examine (1) the theory of
the substituted judgment doctrine; (2) the doctrine of informed consent; (3) the
misapplication of the doctrine of substituted judgment to medical decisions
involving minors and incompetents; (4) the confusion between the best
4566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
51n re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 457 (N.J. 1987) (quoting, Martha Minow, Beyond State
Intervention in the Family: For Baby lane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 933, 973 (1985)).
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interests standard and the doctrine of substituted judgment; and (5) propose a
possible new standard to be used in cases involving minors or incompetents
facing compelled medical procedures.
1I. THE THEORY OF SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT
In 1816, Lord Eldon created the doctrine of substituted judgment to permit
an incompetent person, Hinde, to grant an allowance to his near relative from
the surplus of his estate.6 It has been argued that the creation of this doctrine
was, in itself, a legal fiction and that Lord Eldon established it to allow the
preservation of the law of property while achieving his desire to grant money
to the lunatic's niece.7
Ironically, while Lord Eldon's doctrine of substituted judgment purports to
"act as the lunatic would have acted if of sound mind."8 Lord Eldon "seemed
to have made no effort to discover what had once been in Mr. Hinde's mind.
The Whitbread decision does not mention any evidence of Mr. Hinde's prior
spending practices or his propensity for making gifts."9 Instead Lord Eldon
looked to an objective point of view and found a "generic, reasonable lunatic -
a generic reasonable lunatic prone to giving his money away."'1
While already on shaky ground in the 19th century, the doctrine found its
way into American law and eventually into the area of informed consent in
medical cases. It is here that the "fiction" of substituted judgment has reached
its most dangerous incarnation.
[Miany equity courts assumed the authority to remove vital tissue, to
withhold or withdraw life-support systems, to sterilize the
incompetent, and to force psychotropic drugs on mental patients over
their vocal dissent. Arguably some of these courses of medical
treatment directly harmed the incompetent and directly or indirectly
benefitted others."
11
In theory, the doctrine of substituted judgment looks to the individual to
determine what she would do in a particular situation if she were competent.
This doctrine works well in situations where a person, once competent, is
rendered incompetent to consent to medical procedures through injury or
disease. The once competent person has developed a system of morals and
beliefs, and patterns of behavior which the court can examine when evaluating
6Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878.
7Louise Harmon, Falling Off The Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 22 (1990).
8Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878.
9Harmon, supra note 7, at 23.
101d. at 23 (quoting John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the
Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 61 n. 73 (1976)).
1id. at 60.
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what she would do in a particular situation. 12 The Supreme Court most recently
articulated and accepted this standard in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health.13 The Court, however, went on to hold that in cases involving a
petition to terminate artificial hydration and nutrition of a patient, the states
did not have to accept the substituted judgment of a family member absent
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.14
It is interesting to note, that in a case where the doctrine of substituted
judgment can be applied appropriately, the Supreme Court permits the
requirement of clear and convincing evidence to assure that the wishes
articulated are that of the patient and not of the family, no matter how
well-motivated the family's decision may be. The Cruzan decision illustrates
the Supreme Court's acceptance of a stringent interpretation of this standard
even in a situation where there is some evidence of a patient's desires. It is
ironic, therefore, that several courts of equity have permitted the application
of the substituted judgment doctrine in situations where a patient has never
expressed any evidence of her desires. In theory, the substituted judgment
doctrine should only be applied in cases like Cruzan where a person, once
competent, has made some statements as to her beliefs regarding a particular
situation and has developed a life which can be used as a frame of reference to
determine her wishes.
In In re A.C., the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized that:
Most people do not foresee what calamities may befall them, much less
do they consider, or even think about, treatment alternatives in varying
situations. The court in a substituted judgment case, therefore, should
pay special attention to the known values and goals of the
incapacitated patient and should strive, if possible, to extrapolate from
those values and goals what the patient's decision would be.15
This definition should set the outer limits of the substituted judgment doctrine:
Looking to an individual's known value system to determine her decision in a
particular situation. Instead, courts have tragically misapplied the doctrine of
substituted judgment to achieve what judges believe to be "beneficial"
decisions in cases where consent cannot be obtained. It is here that the doctrine
of substituted judgment and the standard of best interests become confused.
Substituted judgment is a subjective standard, and therefore can only apply to
persons who have been competent at one time. The best interests standard,
12See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
13 1d.
14 d. at 269.
151n re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1250 (D.C. App. 1990). Hospital sought authority to
perform caesarean delivery of terminally ill patient's baby. Tragically, substituted
judgment may have been incorrectly used in this case becausepatient may, in fact, have
been competent to decide. Id. at 1253.
[Vol. 7:107
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however, is to be applied to the minor or incompetent who has never been
competent and is, therefore, entitled to more protection under the law.16
III. THiE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
American common law holds that any individual has the right "to make an
informed choice, if competent to do so, to acceptor forgo medical treatment. 17
Doctors must inform patients of the nature of the proposed treatment, possible
alternative treatment procedures, and the nature and degree of the risk and
benefits involved in accepting or rejecting treatment. Additionally, courts hold
that a surgeon who performs an operation without consent, independent of its
result, may be guilty of a battery, or if a surgeon obtains an insufficiently
informed consent, he may be guilty of negligence.18
The right to accept or refuse treatment has been recognized under the
common law right of self-determination and informed consent.19 Further, the
state cannot compel an individual to submit to invasion of bodily integrity for
the benefit of another person's health:20
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that
one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or take
action to save another human being or to rescue... For our law to
compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do
so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a
rule which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where
the line would be drawn.21 (emphasis added.)
As our law openly recognizes the individual's right of autonomy over her body,
the frequent and often ill-justified use of the substituted judgment standard in
cases involving those who have never been competent is particularly
disturbing. Courts have frequently used the doctrine of substituted judgment
to permit procedures which would not be permitted or consented to by a
competent individual. In doing so, courts have violated the constitutional
16 See generally Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). Mental patients who were
institutionalized were forced to accept unwanted treatment with anti-psychotic drugs.
Court recognized a Massachusetts case which states that liberty interests of person
adjudicated as incompetent are broader than those protected directly by the
Constitution of the United States. Id. at 303.
171n re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243.
181d.
19 See generally In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
20 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. App. 1941) (parental consent is required for
a skin graft from a fifteen year old boy to be used to benefit his cousin who had been
severely burned.)
21573 A.2d at 1244 (quoting McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 90,91 (Allegheny County
Ct. 1978)).
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rights of incompetent patients in denying them the right to informed consent,
guaranteed, except in an emergency, in all jurisdictions in the United States.22
IV. MISAPPLICATION OF THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT DOCTRINE
A. Compelled Organ and Tissue Donation
The doctrine of substituted judgment has been misinterpreted and
misapplied in several situations. Courts have misused this doctrine in cases of
compelled organ and tissue donation by minors and incompetents,
compulsory sterilization of minors and incompetents, and removal and denial
of life-sustaining treatment to minors and incompetents.
The case which established precedent for applying the substituted judgment
doctrine to situations involving incompetents and organ donation was the
Kentucky decision in of Strunk v. Strunk.23 This Kentucky court asked the
question:
Does a court of equity have the power to permit a kidney to be removed
from an incompetent ward of the state upon petition of his committee,
who is also his mother, for the purpose of being transplanted into the
body of his brother, who is dying of a fatal kidney disease?
2 4
Tommy Strunk was twenty-eight years old and dying of kidney disease.2 5 His
brother Jerry was twenty-seven years old and was committed to a statehospital
and school for the incompetent. 2 6 His mental age was approximately six
2 2 See,e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,cert. denied 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). Doctor
failed to disclose a risk of serious disability inherent in laminectomy operation. Patient
became paralyzed and sued doctor for negligent failure to disclose. Id. at 779. "[Dlue
care normally demands that the physician warn the patient of any risks to his well-being
which contemplated therapy may involve. The context in which the duty of
risk-disclosure arises is invariably the occasion for decision as to whether a particular
treatment procedure is to be undertaken." Id. 464 F.2d at 781.
There are two exceptions to the rule of a doctor's duty to disclose. "The first comes
into play when the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting and
harm from a failure to treat is imminent and outweighs any harm threatened by the
proposed treatment." Id. at 788. The second occurs in situations where disclosure may
cause a patient to become so ill or distraught that she cannot make a rational decision.
Id. at 789. "The physician's privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons
must be carefully circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might devour the disclosure
rule itself." Id.
23445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
2 4 1d. at 145.
2 5 1d. at 146.
261d.
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years.27 Tommy's entire family was tested for possible tissue compatibility for
a transplant, but only Jerry's tissue was found to be acceptable.28
This Kentucky court permitted the transplant in this situation and held that
in the
peculiar circumstances of this case it would not only be beneficial to
Tommy but also beneficial to Jerry because Jerry was greatly
dependent upon Tommy, emotionally as well as psychologically, and
that his well-being would be jeopardized more severely by the loss of
his brother than by removal of a kidney.
29
The court in this case based its decision on two key factors. The first was the
"benefit" that would be bestowed upon Jerry by giving his kidney,30 and the
second was what the court perceived to be the "minimal" degree of risk
associated with the procedure.3 1 The court applied the substituted judgment
doctrine based on these factors and held that, "[t]he right to act for the
incompetent in all cases has become recognized in this country as the doctrine
of substituted judgment and is broad enough not only to cover property but
also to cover all matters touching on the well-being of the ward."32
This risk/benefit type of analysis has been criticized for being a utilitarian
manipulation of the substituted judgment doctrine. In situations similar to
Strunk, the benefit incurred by the incompetent can be vaguely and loosely
construed, and there are no criteria or standards for determining what
constitutes a benefit or how much benefit must be shown in each particular
case.33 Additionally, the substituted judgment doctrine mandates that the court
do what the incompetent would do if he were competent to make a decision.
In Strunk, the court based the substituted judgment clearly on its view of a
benefit flowing to the incompetent. "Yet the presence of benefit does not justify
nonconsensual intrusions on competent persons. Rather the determinative
factor appears to be consent or choice-persons may choose or consent to
actions which bring them little or negative benefit."34 The benefits standard
articulated in Strunk assumes three things. First, that an individual will always
do what is "beneficial" to her and second, that a possible psychological "benefit"
may be enough to allow a medical procedure to be performed under the
doctrine of substituted judgment. Finally, it assumes that any "benefit" is
2 71d.
28Id.
2 9 1d.
3 0 1d.
31445 S.W.2d at 148.
321d.
33 See John A. Robertson, Organ Donations By Incompetents and the Substituted Judgnent
Doctrine, 76 COLuM. L. REV. 48, 56 (1976).
3 4 Id.
1992]
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enough to permit a court to allow a guardian to substitute her judgment for
that of an incompetent who has never been competent under the law to make
a decision. If the incompetent's life under the substituted judgment doctrine is
to be protected and respected, and the standard is to be correctly applied, the
precedent articulated in Strunk is improper.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized some of these inherent problems
in In re Guardianship of Pescinski.35 While the court recognized the benefits test
set forward in Strunk, it refused to adopt the doctrine of substituted judgment
as articulated in Strunk.36 This court held:
[ain incompetent particularly should have his own interests protected.
Certainly no advantage should be taken of him. In the absence of real
consent on his part, and in a situation where no benefit to him has been
established, we fail to find any authority for the county court, or this
court, to approve this operation.
3 7
Here, the court recognized the principle of substituted judgment the same way
the Strunk court did. By limiting the scope of Strunk's benefit rule the court
was able to reject its application in these circumstances.
The dissent in the decision recognized that one reason for the court's
judgment may have been its concern with eugenic arguments reminiscent of
Nazi Germany.38 Further, the dissent articulated another misinterpretation of
the substituted judgment doctrine. It first makes a proper analysis of the
doctrine stating: "the court in effect does for the incompetent what it is sure he
would do himself if he had the power to act.' 39 Then, however, the dissent
makes an improper analysis of the goal of the substituted judgment doctrine.
The dissent writes, "[tihis approach gives the incompetent the benefit of the
doubt, endows him with the finest qualities of his humanity, assumes the
goodness of his nature instead of assuming the opposite."40 The assumptions
by the dissent in Pescinski make the doctrine of substituted judgment an
objective one bestowing the best qualities upon all incompetent persons
instead of recognizing substituted judgment as a subjective doctrine, unique
to each individual and his own beliefs and ideals.
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, faced a similar situation
in In re Richardson.4 1 In this case, however, the possible donor was a minor, Roy,
who was mentally retarded. The father in this case wished to compel the
mother to consent to the operation. Since the possible donor was a child, the
35 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975).
36 d. at 181.
371d. at 182.
381d. at 183.
39226 N.W.2d at 184.
401d.
41 284 So. 2d 185 (La. 1973).
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court rejected the substituted judgment doctrine articulated in Strunk, and
stated that under Louisiana law the goal of this decision was to "promote the
ultimate best interest of a minor."42 Counsel for the plaintiff in this case argued
that the transplant could be in Roy's best interest because the donee could take
care of Roy after the death of his parents. The Richardson Court held: "[s]uch
an event is not only highly speculative, but in view of all the facts, highly
unlikely. We find that surgical intrusion and loss of a kidney clearly would be
against Roy's best interest."43
Here, a court refused to accept the substituted judgment doctrine as proper
in cases involving a retarded minor, and instead chose to apply the best
interests standard. Unlike the Strunk court, the Richardson court refused to
allow a potential care relationship to constitute a "benefit" that would be in the
incompetent's best interest. The Richardson court recognized that the removal
of a kidney could rarely be in an incompetent patient's best interest.44 This
court correctly interpreted the difference between the substituted judgment
doctrine and the best interests standard. The Richardson court recognized that
best interests is a standard based on "benefit" while substituted judgment is
based on personal preference. This court correctly refused to apply the
substituted judgment doctrine, and also decided that this operation was not in
Roy's best interest and could not be performed under a best interests standard.
In doing so, this court recognized that benefit is not a proper element to be
considered in making a substituted judgment.
The concurrence in this case refused to even apply a best interests standard
in this particular situation. Judge Gulotta wrote:
I am of the opinion that before the court might exercise its awesome
authority in such an instance and before it considers the question of
the best interests of the child, certain requirements must be met. I am
of the opinion that it must be clearly established that the surgical
intrusion is urgent, that there are no reasonable alternatives, and that
the contingencies are minimal.4 5
Here, a judge refused to apply the doctrine of substituted judgment or a best
interests standard and held the decision to a high level review. Judge Gulotta
recognized the compelling need to protect mentally retarded minors from
bodily intrusions that may be detrimental to their health.
A Connecticut court faced with a unique situation in the case of Hart v.
Brown,46 chose to apply the substituted judgment doctrine articulated in
Strunk. Here, parents of identical twins who were seven years and ten months
42 1d. at 187.
43 Id.
44 Id.
4 51d. at 188.
46289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1972).
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old petitioned the court to allow a kidney transplant from one twin to the other.
This case was particularly unusual because it involved an isograft donation,
which is a "perfect match" and does not carry the risk of rejection involved in
other kidney transplantation.47 The Hart v. Brown court wrote that "the surgical
risk is no more than the risk of the anesthesia .. ." and that "[tihe only real risk
would be trauma to the one remaining kidney, but testimony indicated that
such trauma is extremely rare in civilian life."48 The Hart court then applied the
benefits analysis set forth in Strunk and stated that there would be "immense
benefit to the donor in that the donor would be better off in a family that was
happy than in a family that was distressed and in that it would be a very great
loss to the donor if the donee were to die from her illness."4 9
While the court applied the benefits analysis in this case, it also recognized
that the situation before it was highly unique. First, it recognized the
uniqueness of an isograft transplant. Second, the court recognized that the
donor was a minor who did not suffer from impaired mental capabilities.5 0
Based on these facts, the court held that the natural parents of the children
would be able to substitute their consent for that of their minor children after
a close investigation of their motives. 51
Here, it appears likely that the court approved the application of the
substituted judgment doctrine as the parents' motives were likely to be pure
since neither child was suffering from mental impairment.52 The analysis in
this case was a risk/benefit one which weighed in favor of allowing the
donation based on unique circumstances. The court recognized that the twins
were extremely close and that the family life of the surviving twin would be
greatly damaged by the death of her sister. Overall, the court applied a benefits
analysis as it related to the healthy twin and how the operation would affect
the balance of her life and development. It can be argued, therefore, that this
should have been called a best interests analysis and that after weighing the
alternatives surgery was, in fact, in the healthy child's best interests, even if it
may not be what she would have decided if competent. It is interesting to note
that the court acknowledged that "[t]he donor has been informed of the
operation and insofar as she may be capable of understanding she desires to
donate her kidney so that her sister may return to her.'53
Here, a court applied a new version of the doctrine of substituted judgment.
It allowed a parent's judgment to be substituted for a minor child's in the case
4 7 d. at 388 (a one egg twin carries identical genetic material which eliminates all risk
of rejection).
481d. at 389.
4 91d.
50289 A.2d at 391.
51id. at 390.
52 d. at 391.
531d. at 389.
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of a compelled organ donation. This child had not yet developed the capacity
to consent; yet understood that she did not want her sister to die. This decision
was based on what the court and the parents believed the child would do if she
were mature enough to fully understand the nature of the procedure. In
essence, this is not a substituted judgment, but a combination of substituted
judgment and best interests. A court allowed parents to substitute their
judgment for that of their child, who could not consent, based on what they
believed was in the child's best interests, and what they believed the child
would decide if competent. Since the child had never been legally competent,
however, this is not technically a substituted judgment.
This case most closely parallels the situation in Curran v. Bosze introduced at
the beginning of this article.54 The primary differences are that the potential
donors in Curran were substantially younger than the potential donor in Hart,
and the potential success of the procedure was substantially lower in Curran
than in Hart. Curran rejected the substituted judgment doctrine stating that
there could be no clear and convincing evidence of the twins' intent at such a
young age (three and one half years).55 The Hart court, however, accepted the
doctrine as permissible. It should also be recognized that the family unit was
intact in the Hart case and both parents consented, while the parents were never
married in Curran and the custodial parent disapproved of the procedure. 56
While one of these cases accepted the substituted judgment doctrine in a
situation involving a minor and the other rejected it, these cases can be
reconciled based on facts alone.
Possibly the best way to put the Hart decision in context is to recognize it as
a unique application of the substituted judgment doctrine in a unique situation.
What actually occurred is a "substituted consent" based on the child's limited
understanding of the procedure she would have to go through to save her sister,
combined with what the court believed the child would want, and what the
court believed was in the child's best interests. Overall, this is not a traditional
application nor a theoretically correct application of the substituted judgment
doctrine. Instead of viewing this case as precedent, therefore, it should be
viewed as an unusual application of the substituted judgment doctrine to an
isolated set of facts and circumstances. While the results may seem "fair" and
beneficial to all, this case cannot stand for the proposition that parents can
always substitute their judgment for the judgment of minor children in the case
54See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
55566 N.E.2d at 1325. The court based its decision on the fact that, "It is not possible
to discover the child's 'likely treatment/nontreatment preferences' by examining the
child's 'philosophical, religious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose
of life and the way it should be lived, and attitudes towards sickness, medical
procedures, suffering and death."' Id. at 1326 (quoting In re Estate of Longeway, 549
N.E.2d 292, 299 (I. 1989), (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987) (citations
omitted)).
56566 N.E.2d at 1321.
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of compelled organ or tissue donation. Curran v. Bosze recognizes this and
rejects this standard in a similar situation.
There are several problems with the application of the substituted judgment
doctrine in cases of compelled organ donation. Ordinarily, "when the mental
or social condition of the patient or subject precludes legally effective consent
to a personal intrusion.., respect for persons usually entails prohibiting the
intrusive activity."57 Because children and the mentally impaired have never
developed the capacity to consent under the law, courts have frequently used
a convoluted version of the substituted judgment doctrine involving a
"benefits" analysis. The problem with this standard, as illustrated in Strunk, is
that a "benefit" can be construed as any psychological benefit to the
incompetent, no matter how slight. It is almost bizzare to recognize that in cases
such as Strunk, a court has held that the possible "psychological benefit" to an
institutionalized individual of not losing a relative justifies a surgical invasion
of the incompetent's body and removal of his organ. Even more disturbing is
that often the parents of an incompetent, who are attempting to save a life of
their "normal" child, are the individuals entrusted with making the substituted
judgment for their incompetent child. While courts also appoint a guardian ad
litem to aid in these decisions, it is thejudgment of the parent or legal guardian
that courts hold in the highest regard.
In analyzing the "benefit" construed upon an incompetent, courts frequently
disregard the risks involved in organ donation:
If the risk were trivial, a question of principle would still exist, but the
chances and consequences of abuse would be lowered. To make a
substituted judgment concerning an organ transplant, it is essential to
be clear about the effect of the transplant on the donor, since a
competent person similarly situated is likely to consider the
consequences to himself. To an incompetent, who may be less able to
understand the transplant procedures or to adapt to the unfamiliar
surroundings of a hospital, the risks of an organ transplant may be
even greater.
5 8
57 Robertson, supra note 33, at 50. Robertson also writes that "the use of children and
the institutionalized mentally impaired in experimentation cannot be rationalized in
terms of consent precisely because they are incapable of consent." Id.
While organ transplantation is not "experimental," the theory is the same. Surgery
performed on persons incapable of consent cannot be rationalized in terms of consent.
58 d. at .69 (footnotes omitted). The Curran court, which rejects the substituted
judgment doctrine, carefully evaluates the risks inherent in the surgery:
[w]hile the incidence of risk is not very high, the risk is medically significant.
When a 3 1/2-year-old child undergoes a bone marrow harvesting procedure,
the child is put under general anesthesia. Special needles are put through the
skin into the hip bones at the back on both sides of the child and at the front on
both sides. Dr. Johnson testified that in order to obtain the amount of bone
marrow which would be necessary for a transplant to Jean Pierre, the bone
would have to be punctured 100 separate times.
Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d at 1333.
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While several courts have analyzed organ transplant cases based on the
"minimal risks" involved in organ donation,59 few courts have recognized that
these risks may be magnified for the mentally incompetent.
Authors have even argued that, "[ulse of an institutionalized incompetent
might inspire his attendants to devote special care and attention to him out of
a sense of obligation or otherwise. Or, as a condition or natural result of the
organ donation, it might be decided to assure the incompetent the best of
medical care .... .,60 These types of arguments are at best speculative and
attempt to justify what can only be viewed as invasions of the bodily integrity
of incompetents to benefit others considered more valuable by our society.
B. Compulsory Sterilization
Just as the doctrine of substituted judgement has been tragically misapplied
in cases of compelled organ donation, it has also been misused in cases
involving compulsory sterilization of incompetents. The best example of this
misuse is found in the 1978 case of Stump v. Sparkman.61 In this case, a circuit
court judge permitted the sterilization of a fifteen year old girl upon petition
of her mother. The mother stated that her somewhat retarded daughter had
been associating with older men and that it would be in her best interests to
undergo tubal ligation "to prevent 'unfortunate circumstances' . . ." in the
future.62 The judge permitted the procedure and the daughter was told that
she was to have her appendix removed. Two years later, she was married and
found out the true nature of her procedure when she attempted to become
pregnant.63 Although the key issue the Supreme Court examined in this case
was whether the judge acted within his jurisdiction and was therefore immune
from liability,64 it is important to note that a judge accepted a mother's
"substituted judgment" regarding sterilization, which was clearly without her
daughter's consent. Deception was even used to lure the daughter into the
medical procedure. This case is a clear demonstration that the judgment of a
parent or guardian may not always be the judgment of an incompetent and
that the substituted judgment of a parent may not always be in a child's best
interest when the child is mentally retarded.
In Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hospital, Inc.,65 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland wavered between application of the substituted judgment doctrine
59Strunk supra note 2, 445 S.W.2d at 149.
60Robertson, supra note 33, at 70.
61435 U.S. 349 (1978).
621d. at 351.
63 1d. at 353.
64Id. at 364. While the Court held Judge Stump immune from damages, it recognized
that the judge's approval of the petition was in error. Id.
65447 A.2d 1244 (Md. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983).
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and a best interests standard. In this case the mother and grandmother of a 13
year old mentally incompetent female petitioned the court to permit
sterilization because of her inability to understand and handle her own bodily
functions. 66 Ultimately, the court applied a best interests standard in this
situation as the incompetent was a minor. The court cited Strunk as precedent
and also cited In re Mary Moe67 which held that a trial court should apply the
substituted judgment doctrine to cases where it must determine whether to
authorize sterilization.68 The Wentzel court, which ultimately permitted the
sterilization, seems uncertain as to which standard it actually applied. The
dissent in this case, however, makes it clear that substituted judgment is the
proper standard in this situation:
Thus, under the doctrine of substituted judgment, in determining
whether to authorize sterilization, the trial court must not be
concerned solely with objective criteria of what is in the best interests
of the incompetent minor, but rather must place primary emphasis
upon the decision that would be made by the incompetent minor if he
or she were competent. Only by so doing can the incompetent minor's
personal fundamental rights be fully protected and, therefore, the
incompetent minor's best interests be fully preserved.
69
This dissenting judge also assumes that the substituted judgment doctrine and
the best interests standard can be equated with each other and that best interests
are the ultimate result of substituted judgment.
Two courts, however, have recognized the abuse of the substituted judgment
doctrine in cases of compulsory sterilization. In In re A. W., 70 the Supreme Court
of Colorado, sitting En Banc, refused to allow the sterilization of a 12 year old
mentally incompetent girl based on her parents' substituted judgment. This
court held that:
66 d. 447 A.2d at 1246.
67432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982).
68 Wentzel, 447 A.2d at 1251 (citing In re Mary Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982)).
While the court decided that the substituted judgment doctrine was the proper test to
apply, this court, and the Wentzel court confused this doctrine with the best interests
standard:
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that the trial court-
a court of general equity jurisdiction-possessed inherent equitable power
to grant a petition for sterilization, shown to be in the best interest of the
mentally incompetent ward. In so holding, the court said "that the [trial]
court is to determine whether to authorize sterilization when requested
by the parents or guardian by finding the incompetent would so choose if
competent.
Id.
69 d. at 1263 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
70637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981); but see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), upholding a
Virginia sterilization statute and making the infamous statement that "[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough." 274 U.S. at 207.
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Simply allowing the parents or guardians of the mentally retarded
person to substitute their decision and consent to sterilization for that
of the incompetent person is not an adequate solution to the problem.
Consent by parents to the sterilization of their mentally retarded
offspring has a history of abuse which indicates that parents, at least
in this limited context, cannot be presumed to have an identity of
interest with their children.
71
This court recognized that the inconveniences and difficulties associated with
caring for an incompetent child may cause parents to make decisions which
infringe upon their offspring's procreational rights.72
This conflict of interest is also recognized in the case of Conservatorship of
Valerie N.73 The California Court of Appeals held that there is "[a]n increasing
awareness of conflicts which may exist between incompetent persons and
those who are charged with their care."74 This California court went on to state:
[B]ecause many unknown and variable considerations are thus
involved in a decision whether or not to undergo or impose
sterilization, it is perceptibly necessary that the procedure be limited
to persons who are able to give informed consent. The limitation
71637 P.2d at 370 (footnotes omitted).
721d. These fears include sexual promiscuity and exploitation. This court recognizes
procreational rights as fundamental and also recognizes that sterilization has been
greatly abused by guardians in the past.
73199 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), affd 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985). The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court in holding that conservators were not
entitled to have conservatee sterilized. The Supreme Court of California affirmed,
holding that the California statute prohibiting sterilization of those under
conservatorship "Idleprives developmentally disabled persons of privacy and liberty
interests ... " Id. at 771-72. The court explicitely ruled, however, that its judgment was
without prejudice to a renewed petition to establish that sterilizatoin was necessary to
the conservatee's habilitation. Id. at 762.
In assuming that those who are incompetent have a right to procreative choice the
court may have made a drastic mistake in reasoning. As observed in Chief Justice Bird's
dissent:
Today's holding will permit the state, through the legal fiction of substituted
consent, to deprive many women permanently of the right to conceive and
bear children. The majority run roughshod over this fundamental constitu-
tional right in a misguided attempt to guarantee a right of procreative choice
for one they assume has never been capable of choice and never will be. Yet
precisely because choice and consent are meaningless concepts when applied
to such a person, the majority's invocation of the theory of precreative choice
and the fiction of substituted consent cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Id. at 781-82 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
74199 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978)).
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protects the fundamental right of an incompetent person to bear
children.
75
While several courts have recognized the varying motivations of parents and
guardians in situations involving compulsory sterilization, few courts have
recognized this problem in cases of organ donation. This distinction can easily
be traced to a benefits analysis. In cases of organ donation, the person to be
benefitted may receive life and health. Without the surgery, the donee may die
or be subjected to a painful and difficult lifestyle. It is also argued that the donor
may benefit psychologically. In situations involving sterilization, however, it
is the guardians who are benefitted both physically, as they do not have to deal
with the problems of menstruation and conception, and psychologically, as
they do not have to worry about promiscuity. The detriment to the incompetent
female, however, may arguably be too great as she loses her fundamental right
to bear children. In situations where the benefit involves the life and health of
a competent individual, such as cases of organ donation, as opposed to a
guardian's peace of mind, as in sterilization cases, courts are more willing to
apply the doctrine of substituted judgment and infringe upon the rights of an
incompetent person.
C. Refusal and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment
The medical situation best designed for application of the substituted
judgment doctrine is the decision to refuse or discontinue life-sustaining
treatment. This is only true, however, in situations where a patient was once
competent. Frequently, this situation involves a person who has become
incompetent through disease or accident but who has already developed a
system of ideals and beliefs which can be applied in making a substituted
judgment. Paradoxically, this has been the situation in which courts are most
reluctant to apply the substituted judgment doctrine. The only Supreme Court
decision involving the substituted judgment doctrine in this situation is Cruzan
v. Missouri Department of Health.76 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court held that due
process did not require a state to accept the substituted judgmentof close family
members without substantial proof that their views reflect those of the
patient.77 Even though Nancy Cruzan had made general statements about her
desire to discontinue her life if she were in a vegetative state,78 the Supreme
Court did not find this to be sufficient evidence of her intent. The tenor of the
Supreme Court's opinion also recognized that Nancy Cruzan's parents were
7 5 1d. Procreation has been recognized as a fundamental right for our fifty years. See
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
76497 U.S. 261 (1990).
7 7 1d. at 285-86.
7 8 1d. at 285. Nancy "'[eixpressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat serious
conversation with a housemate friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to
continue her life unless she could live at least halfway normally . I...'" Id. at 268.
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people with the best possible motives and concerns.79 Additionally the Court
wrote that "there is no automatic assurance that the view of close family
members will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been had she
been confronted with the prospect of her situation while competent. "80
In the case of an incompetent sixty-seven year old male with an I.Q. of ten,
however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts came to a drastically
different decision. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,81 a
Superintendent of a state institution petitioned the court to make a decision
regarding administration of chemotherapy treatments for a man suffering with
acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia. Ultimately, the court let this decision
turn on a general right in all persons to refuse medical treatment and extended
this right to include those who are incompetent.82 This court applied the
substituted judgment doctrine, and distinguished this case from other right to
die cases in stating:
To make a worthwhile comparison, one would have to ask whether a
majority of people would choose chemotherapy if they were told
merely that something outside of their previous experience was going
to be done to them, that this something would cause them pain and
discomfort, that they would be removed to strange surroundings and
possibly restrained for extended periods of time, and that the
advantages of this course of action were measured V concepts of time
and mortality beyond their ability to comprehend.
While this court found that most people in a similar situation to Mr. Saikewicz
elect to undergo chemotherapy,84 this court still held that the decision to
79Id.
No doubt is engendered by anything in this record but that Nancy Cruzan's
mother and father are loving and caring parents. If the state were required
by the United States Constitution to repose a right of "substituted judgment"
with anyone, the Cruzans would surely qualify. But we do not think the Due
Process Clause requires the State to repose judgment on these matters with
anyone but the patient herself. Close family members may have a strong
feeling-a feeling not at all ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disinter-
ested, either-that they do not wish to witness the continuation of the life of
a loved one which they regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even degrading.
Id. at 286.
8 0Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286.
81370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
82 1d. at 427. "To protect the incompetent person within its power, the State must
recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and afford to that person the same
panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent persons." Id. at 428.
Here again, a court is applying a theory of choice to a person who is not capable
of such a "choice" under the law.
831d. at 430.
841d. at 431.
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withhold treatment from Mr. Saikewicz "was based on a regard for his actual
interests and preferences .... "85 This decision was based primarily on Mr.
Saikewicz's inability to understand the treatment that he would have to
undergo.86 While this court may actually have been making a decision which
was in Mr. Saikewicz's best interests, the court's reasoning is twisted in such a
manner as to allow this decision to be a substituted judgment. Technically, this
court based its decision on what Mr. Saikewicz would have decided if
competent. Theoretically, however, Mr. Saikewicz can never have made such a
decision and therefore cannot have the doctrine of substituted judgment
applied. While this case may arguably have been correctly decided, it could not
have been decided applying the doctrine of substituted judgment.
Mr. Saikewicz, who had never been able to express any sort of opinion
regarding chemotherapy treatments, was permitted to have his guardian's
judgment substituted for his in this situation. Ms. Cruzan, who had expressed
some opinions regarding her situation, was not permitted to have her parents'
judgment substituted for hers. While Cruzan was decided after Saikewicz, the
key distinguishing factor is that Mr. Saikewicz had never been competent while
Ms. Cruzan had been. Additionally, Missouri required a standard of clear and
convincing evidence while Massachusetts did not. In a case where substituted
judgment could not in theory be applied, a court chose to apply the doctrine.
In a case where substituted judgment could reasonably have been applied,
however, the Supreme Court refused to do so.
Prior to the Cruzan decision, several courts permitted the use of substituted
judgment for removal of life-sustaining medical treatment from persons in an
irreversible vegetative state.87 Cruzan, however, is not viewed as controlling
precedent in all situations involving removal of life-sustaining treatment. The
Supreme court did not mandate that courts apply the standard of clear and
851d. at 432.
861d.
The two factors considered by the probate judge to weigh in favor of admin-
istering chemotherapy were: (1) the fact that most people elect chemotherapy
and (2) the chance of a longer life. Both are appropriate indicators of what
Saikewicz himself would have wanted, provided that due allowance is taken
for this individual's present and future incompetency. We have already
discussed the perspective this brings to the fact that most people choose to
undergo chemotherapy. With regard to the second factor, the chance of a longer
life carries the same weight for Saikewicz as for any other person, the value of
life under the law having no relation to intelligence or social position.
Id. at 431. It is ironic, therefore, that this court chose to permit this procedure after
recognizing that the life of an incompetent has the same value as the life of a competent
individual.
87See generally In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989) (recognizing that
the guardian of a terminally ill patient in an irreversible coma may exercise the right to
refuse artificial nutrition and hydration); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (noting
that the right of patient in an irreversible vegetative state to determine whether to refuse
life sustaining treatment can be exercised by a patient's family or close friend).
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convincing evidence required in the state of Missouri. 88 Rather, Cruzan
permitted the states to apply such a standard.
Additionally, Cruzan does not serve as precedent in cases such as Saikewicz.
The Cruzan decision applies to persons once competent who, through accident
or illness remain in a persistent vegetative state. Saikewicz, however, stands for
the proposition that the court may apply the doctrine of substituted judgment
to situations where a person who has never been competent under the law must
decide whether to accept or reject life prolonging treatment. While the Saikewicz
court presents its decision under the rubric of "the right to refuse medical
treatment," this application is particularly dangerous in cases involving the
mentally deficient. As medical costs increase and medical technology
improves, the doctrine of substituted judgment may be applied in a utilitarian
manner to deprive incompetents of medical care they may be entitled to.
Although it has been argued that, "the substituted judgment doctrine is
explicitly non-utilitarian, and makes no claim that the rights of incompetents
may be overridden to advance the interests of others, where the rights of
competents may not be similarly overridden,"89 this is specifically what has
been done in cases such as Strunk and Saikewicz. When the life of an
incompetent becomes devalued to aid another or refuse a human being medical
treatment, the substituted judgment doctrine has reached its most ominous
application. It creates generic, reasonable idiots who may be prone to giving
their organs or their lives away.90
V. CONFUSION BETWEEN BEST INTERESTS AND SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT
The basic problem courts have with the application of the substituted
judgment doctrine in cases involving minors and the mentally incompetent is
that it is frequently confused with the best interests standard. The best interests
standard allows decisions to be made which promote a patient's best interests.
This standard is usually applied in terms of beneficence and looks to
consequences which will benefit a minor or incompetent. 91 Alternatively,
"[s]ubstituted judgment is an effort to make the decision the person would have
made if competent. As we have seen time and time again, subjects and patients
do not always make the decisions that others feel are in their best interests."92
Even leading authorities on medical ethics, however, have blurred the
distinction between the two standards. According to Paul Applebaum, Charles
Lidz and Alan Meisel;
88Cruzan, 497 U.S at 282, 284.
89See Robertson, supra note 33, at 76.
90Harmon, supra note 7, at 41.
91D. Don Welch, Walking in their Shoes: Paying Respect to Incompetent Patients, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1617, 1629 (1989).
9 2 1d. at 1629.
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All surrogate decisions makers are, in a general way, under a duty to
act in the best interest of incompetent patients. The difficulty with the
best interests standard is not in the statement of it but in giving content
to it. The substituted judgment approach is, in fact, one way of doing
so. That is, a surrogate who makes a decision for an incompetent
patient on the basis of that patient's instructions-written or oral,
express or implied-is seeking to implement the patient's best interests
as the patient would have defined them. Thus, the substituted judgment
approach is merely one way in which the best interests standard is
given content.
93
D. Don Welch criticizes this argument in his article "Walking in Their Shoes:
Paying Respect to Incompetent Patients." He writes:
This statement is exactly wrong. Substituted judgment is not a way of
giving content to the best interests standard. Rather, best interests is
one item that should be taken into account when making a substituted
judgment. The inverted relationship in which these authors place the
two concepts reflects their failure to acknowledge the priority that
autonomy should have over beneficence in their development of a
theory of informed consent.
94
Even the Strunkcourt reveals a confusion between the best interests standard
and the substituted judgment doctrine when it places an emphasis on benefit.95
Theoretically, benefit should notbe the key issue in a substituted judgment, but
rather is a key issue in a best interests standard.
Other judges have made the same mistake when evaluating the substituted
judgment doctrine in relation to the best interests standard. In Wentzel v.
Montgomery General Hospital, Inc., Judge Smith wrote, "Each approach has its
own difficulties, but use of the doctrine of substituted judgment promotes best
the interests of the individual, no matter how difficult the task involved may
be."96 This is precisely what a substituted judgment is not designed to do.
Rather, substituted judgment allows a patient to make decisions that may be
contrary to her best interests, based on her personal preferences. 97
931d. at 1629 (citing P. APPLEBAUM, C. LiDz & A. MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 99 (1987)) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
941d. at 1630.
95 Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 148. Justice Day, dissenting in In reGuardianship of Pescliski,
226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1975) wrote:
The court in that case [Strunk] did find, based on the testimony of a psychiatrist,
that while the incompetent had the mental age of six, it would be of benefit to
him to keep his brother alive so that his brother could visit him on occasion; I
would regard this as pretty thin soup on which to base a decision as to whether
or not the donee is to be permitted to live.
96 447 A.2d at 1259.
9 71n re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 59-60 n.20 (Mass. 1981).
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A benefits test is frequently applied when equating best interests with
substituted judgment. It is argued that respect for incompetents is preserved
when making decisions in this manner because:
A competent person will ordinarily satisfy his wants and preferences.
To the extent that the benefits rule advances the incompetent's
previously expressed preferences, or procures him more of the primary
goods if his preferences are unknown, there is a firm basis for ascribing
to him choices which yield a net benefit.
98
Here again, a presumption of best interests is intermingled with the doctrine
of substituted judgment though this is theoretically incorrect.
Perhaps the reasons for this confusion are the differing situations to which
courts have applied substituted judgment. In cases involving removal of
life-sustaining treatment from those who were competent but are presently in
a vegetative state, courts have easily looked to a subjective standard which is
based on the patient's actual, expressed beliefs and wants. In cases involving
organ transplantation, sterilization, or refusal of life-sustaining treatment to
minors or those who have never been competent, courts are confused as to what
standard to apply. This may be because minors and incompetents are
traditionally accorded the best interests standard in cases involving issues of
informed consent.99 In an effort to allow procedures to be performed which
courts view as beneficial to "society" rather than to the incompetent individual,
judges have become uncomfortable with the best interests standard which is
paternalistic in nature and benefits the incompetent. Therefore, courts have
looked for another doctrine to apply and have found substituted judgment.
The problem in applying this standard to those who have never been
competent, however, is that the substituted judgment doctrine is not
theoretically based on benefit, yet benefit cannot be overlooked in cases
involving incompetents. Therefore, courts have incorrectly applied the
substituted judgment doctrine to cases involving minors and incompetents by
combining this doctrine with a best interests beneficence analysis. This is
wrong in theory and in practice, and allows procedures to be performed on
those typically accorded more protection under the law, which may never have
been permitted had they been capable of consent. The result is to give the
incompetent less protection then the competent thereby rendering nugatory
the true purpose of the doctrine.
VI. DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STANDARD
In order to alleviate the confusion surrounding the application of the
substituted judgment doctrine to cases involving minors and incompetents, a
new standard must be developed to apply to these particular circumstances.
98 Robertson, supra note 33, at 64 (footnote omitted). "Primary goods are 'things that
every rational man is assumed to want."' Id. at 64 n. 94.
99 Welch, supra note 91, at 1617.
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This new standard would be applied in cases involving compelled medical
procedures to be performed on minors and incompetents which are not life
saving or life prolonging. This standard will cover situations similar to Curran,
Strunk and Wentzel, but will not apply to cases such as Saikewicz, where the
medical procedure is, in fact, life saving or life prolonging and perhaps a basic
best interests standard should be applied. Nor will this standard apply to cases
such as Cruzan where a person who was once competent has expressed beliefs
and wishes and a substituted judgement may be ideal. This standard will not
be applicable to cases involving fetal organ and tissue donation or
anencephalatic babies. These issues are best left to another discussion as they
involve the rights of the unborn and complicated issues of brain development
and survival which are not addressed in this discussion. Rather, this standard
would be implemented to protect the young and the incompetent from abuse,
and to keep parents and courts from placing less value on the life of an
incompetent.
This new standard begins with the proposition that substituted judgment
can never be used in cases involving minors and the mentally deficient. In
theory and by definition, substituted judgment can only be applied in
situations where persons have developed a system of judgment in addition to
beliefs and ideals. This can never be true in cases of very young or permanently
incompetent persons.
The second element of this proposed standard involves a presumption that
no compelled medical procedure is in a minor's or incompetent's best
interests.100 Although several cases merely brush over this fact, all surgery has
inherent risks, and these risks may be magnified where a person is too young
or unable to understand the procedure. Second, pain may be more difficult to
detect and handle in cases of the young or mentally deficient as they may not
be able to express and identify how and where they hurt.
Since this standard will be based on a presumption that no compelled
procedure is in best interests, one can only rebut this presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. In essence, this makes the standard a "higher scrutiny
10OWalter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, IssUEs IN LAW
AND MEDICINE VOL. 1 NUMBER 2 131 (1985). Weber makes a similar proposal which he
labels the "presumptions approach" which basically states that the incompetent
individual is presumed to desire life. Id. at 154 n. 129. Weber argues:
The incompetent patient, maintained by certain therapies, is presumed to
desire life. To the extent that physicians and caretakers nevertheless proceed
to 'unplug' incompetents, this standard will act only to prevent the official
devaluation of the lives of incompetents and the sanctioned pressure on
the caretakers of incompetents to dispose of their wards... Thus, the presump-
tions approach may reduce the efficient allocation of resources. While this
public policy goal may suffer, the social goal of upholding life gains. The
presumptions approach would manifest the state's special solicitude for its
weaker members and effectively proclaim the great respect held for all human life.
Id. at 155. The standard proposed in this article, however, protects not only the sanctity
of life of the incompetent, but her right to bodily integrity and her right to procreational
autonomy.
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best interests standard." The proof required will be much more than an
amorphous psychological benefit which may inure upon the minor or
incompetent who may undergo the medical procedure. While psychological
benefit may be real, there are different levels of "psychological benefit" and
specific facts must be considered in each case. This may allow for certain cases
of sterilization where it can be proven by several sources that it is in the
incompetent's best interests, or other possible procedures not contemplated by
this article which may even pass muster of a higher scrutiny best interests test.
Although family may seem like the ultimate decision maker in cases such as
the ones mentioned in this article, cases like Strunk have shown that parents
may not always be disinterested parties. Parents sometimes look out for their
own interests or the interests of others when determining the fate of their
incompetent child or adult. Therefore, there must be more sources than just the
family to turn to in cases such as these. Although courts already appoint
guardians ad litem, deference is usually paid to parents or guardians in
situations involving substituted judgment. Since it clear that substituted
judgment should not be applied in these cases, it follows that parent's or
guardian's decisions should not be given greater weight than the decision of
the guardian ad litem. Additionally, medical doctors and psychologists should
have a great deal of input into these decisions, as should medical ethicists. The
combination of the family, the legal community, the medical community and
the philosophical community with a higher scrutiny level should best protect
the interests of minors or incompetents in these situations. The strong
presumption approach is still necessary in combination with several decision
makers as these decisions must be made based on benefit to the individual and
not to "society" as a whole. The presumption approach eliminates room for
abuse in these situations.
Decisions involving organ and tissue donation frequently must be made
quickly. Nevertheless, courts should not disregard the safeguards built into
this proposed standard but must exercise them expeditiously. Priority should
be given to these types of cases, and our medical and legal systems should
cooperate in procuring the proper experts. Sometimes this may fail, but this
failure should be viewed in the same way we view our criminal justice system.
The margin of error should be on the side of the incompetent, just as it is on the
side of the criminal defendant. With these safeguards in place, incompetents
will not be treated as tissue and organ banks used to benefit those considered
more valuable to society.
VII. CONCLUSION
Medicine and technology have advanced to a point where procedures that
were never before possible are now routine and common. With further
advancement, procedures we have not even contemplated may become
commonplace. Cases such as Curran v. Bosze recognize the difficulty in applying
present legal standards to situations and procedures that have been developed
and are being developed. The doctrine of substituted judgment, developed in
the 19th Century, is clearly not applicable in many of these new situations
where minors and incompetents are involved. The law needs a new standard
which allows certain procedures to be performed when truly equitable and
necessary, but which prevents the abuse of those who cannot protect
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themselves. The standards which presently exist are not sufficient and permit
the utilitarian use of minors and incompetents to benefit those who are
competent. If this abuse is to be prevented, courts must recognize the fiction of
the substituted judgment standard as it is now applied and adopt a new
standard which protects the rights of incompetents and treats them as persons
with value and dignity under the law.
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